This paper studies argumentation-based dialogues between agents. It takes a previously defined system by which agents can trade arguments and examines the outcomes of the dialogues this system permits. In addition to providing a first characterisation of such outcomes, the paper also investigates the extent to which outcomes are dependent on tactical play by the agents, and arguing that this violates principles of mechanism design, identifies how to prevent tactics having an effect.
INTRODUCTION
When building multi-agent systems, we take for granted the fact that the agents which make up the system will need to communicate: to resolve differences of opinion and conflicts of interest; to work together to resolve dilemmas or find proofs; or simply to inform each other of pertinent facts. Many of these communication requirements cannot be fulfilled by the exchange of single messages. Instead, the agents concerned need to be able to exchange a sequence of messages which all bear upon the same subject. In other words they need the ability to engage in dialogues. As a result of this requirement, there has been much work on providing agents with the ability to hold such dialogues. Recently some of this work has considered argument-based approaches to dialogue, for example the work by Dignum et Persuasion Dialogues: One party seeks to persuade another party to adopt a belief or point-of-view he or she does not currently hold. These dialogues begin with one party supporting a particular statement which the other party to the dialogue does not, and the first seeks to convince the second to adopt the proposition. The second party may not share this objective.
Our previous work investigated capturing these types of dialogue using a formal model of argumentation [2] , and the properties and complexity of such dialogues [19] . Here we extend this investigation, turning to consider the questions "how can we characterise the outcomes of dialogues",
and "to what extent are the outcomes of dialogues predetermined?" In other words, how does the knowledge that agents have affect the final result of the dialogue, and does it matter what locutions agents utter, and in what order they utter illocutions, or are the results of the dialogue entirely determined by what the agents know and the protocols they use? One of the interesting things about this question is that the kind of answer we would like to the above question depends on our perspective. On one hand, it seems attractive for agents to be able to "control their own destiny", and have the ability to reach different outcomes 1 depending on how they act within the constraints of a dialogue protocol. On the other hand, from a mechanism design [12] perspective, it is attractive for the protocol to ensure that agents with the same knowledge coming into a dialogue will always find the same result-that way the protocol can be seen to stop one agent misleading another. As we shall see, our formal framework makes both answers to the question possible under different conditions.
Note that, despite the fact that the types of dialogue we are considering are drawn from the analysis of human dialogues, we are only concerned here with dialogues between artificial agents. Unlike Grosz and Sidner [10] for example, we choose to focus in this way in order to simplify our task-dealing with artificial languages avoids much of the complexity inherent in natural language dialogues.
BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly introduce the formal system of argumentation which forms the backbone of our approach. This is inspired by the work of Dung [6] but goes further in dealing with preferences between arguments. Further details are available in [1] . We start with a possibly inconsistent knowledge base Σ with no deductive closure. We assume Σ contains formulas of a propositional language L. stands for classical inference and ≡ for logical equivalence. An argument is a proposition and the set of formulae from which it can be inferred: 
H is called the support of A, written H = Support(A) and h is the conclusion of A written h = Conclusion(A).
We talk of h being supported by the argument (H , h) In general, since Σ is inconsistent, arguments in A(Σ), the set of all arguments which can be made from Σ, will conflict, and we make this idea precise with the notion of undercutting:
Definition 2. Let A1 and A2 be two arguments of A(Σ). A1 undercuts A2 iff ∃h ∈ Support(A2) such that h ≡ ¬Con-clusion(A1). 1 In the sense of what agents end up believing.
In other words, an argument is undercut if and only if there is another argument which has as its conclusion the negation of an element of the support for the first argument.
To capture the fact that some facts are more strongly believed 2 we assume that any set of facts has a preference order over it. We suppose that this ordering derives from the fact that the knowledge base Σ is stratified into non-overlapping sets Σ1, . . . , Σn such that facts in Σi are all equally preferred and are more preferred than those in Σj where j > i. The preference level of a nonempty subset H of Σ, level (H ), is the number of the highest numbered layer which has a member in H .
Definition 3. Let A1 and A2 be two arguments in A(Σ).
A1 is preferred to A2 according to Pref , Pref (A1, A2), iff level (Support(A1)) ≤ level (Support(A2)).
By
Pref we denote the strict pre-order associated with Pref . If A1 is preferred to A2, we say that A1 is stronger than A2
3 . We can now define the argumentation system we will use:
• A(Σ) is a set of the arguments built from Σ,
• Undercut is a binary relation representing the defeat relationship between arguments, Undercut ⊆ A(Σ) × A(Σ), and

• Pref is a (partial or complete) preordering on A(Σ) × A(Σ).
The preference order makes it possible to distinguish different types of relation between arguments:
Definition 5. Let A1, A2 be two arguments of A(Σ).
• If A2 undercuts A1 then A1 defends itself against A2 iff A1 Pref A2. Otherwise, A1 does not defend itself.
• A set of arguments S defends A iff: ∀ B undercuts A and A does not defend itself against B then ∃ C ∈ S such that C undercuts B and B does not defend itself against C .
Henceforth, C Undercut,Pref will gather all non-undercut arguments and arguments defending themselves against all their undercutting arguments. In [1] , it was shown that the set S of acceptable arguments of the argumentation system A(Σ), Undercut , Pref is the least fixpoint of a function F:
The set of acceptable arguments for an argumentation system A(Σ), Undercut , Pref is:
An argument is acceptable if it is a member of the acceptable set.
An acceptable argument is one which is, in some sense, proven since all the arguments which might undermine it are themselves undermined.
LOCUTIONS AND ATTITUDES
As in our previous work, agents decide what they know by determining which propositions they have acceptable arguments for. They trade propositions for which they have acceptable arguments, and accept propositions put forward by other agents if they find that the arguments are acceptable. The exact locutions and the way that they are exchanged define a formal dialogue game which agents engage in.
Dialogues are assumed to take place between two agents, for example called P and C . Each agent has a knowledge base, ΣP and ΣC respectively, containing their beliefs. In addition, each agent has a further knowledge base, accessible to both agents, containing commitments made in the dialogue 4 . These commitment stores are denoted CS (P ) and CS (C ) respectively, and in this dialogue system an agent's commitment store is just a subset of its knowledge base. Note that the union of the commitment stores can be viewed as the state of the dialogue at a given time. Each agent has access to their own private knowledge base and both commitment stores. Thus P can make use of A(ΣP ∪ CS (C )), Undercut , Pref 5 and C can make use of A(ΣC ∪ CS (P )), Undercut , Pref .
All the knowledge bases contain propositional formulas and are not closed under deduction, and all are stratified by degree of belief as discussed above. Here we assume that these degrees of belief are static and that both the players agree on them, though it is possible [3] to combine different sets of preferences, and it is also possible to have agents modify their beliefs on the basis of the reliability of their acquaintances [15] .
With this background, we can present the set of dialogue moves first introduced in [19] . Each locution has a rule describing how to update commitment stores after the move, and groups of moves have conditions under which the move can be made-these are given in terms of the agents' assertion and acceptance attitudes (defined below). For all moves, player P addresses the ith move of the dialogue to player C.
assert(p)
. where p is a propositional formula.
Here p can be any propositional formula, as well as the special character U, discussed below.
assert(S).
where S is a set of formulas representing the support of an argument.
CSi (P ) = CS (P )i−1∪S and CSi
The counterpart of these moves are the acceptance moves. They can be used whenever the protocol and the agent's acceptance attitude allow. 4 Following Hamblin [11] commitments here are propositions that an agent is prepared to defend. 5 Which, of course, is exactly the same thing as A(ΣP ∪ CS (P ) ∪ CS (C )), Undercut, Pref .
accept(p). p is a propositional formula.
CSi (P ) = CSi−1(P )∪{p} and CSi (C ) = CSi−1(C ) accept(S). S is a set of propositional formulas.
There are also moves which allow questions to be posed.
challenge(p).
where p is a propositional formula.
A challenge is a means of making the other player explicitly state the argument supporting a proposition. In contrast, a question can be used to query the other player about any proposition.
question(p)
We refer to this set of moves as the set M DC . The locutions in M DC are similar to those discussed in legal reasoning [8, 21] and it should be noted that there is no retract locution. Note that these locutions are ones used within dialogueslocutions such as those discussed in [14] would be required to frame dialogues.
We also need to define the attitudes which control the assertion and acceptance of propositions.
Definition 7. An agent may have one of two assertion attitudes.
• a confident agent can assert any proposition p for which it can construct an argument (S , p).
• a careful agent can assert any proposition p if it is unable to construct a stronger argument for ¬p.
• a thoughtful agent can assert any proposition p for which it can construct an acceptable argument (S , p).
Definition 8. An agent may have one of three acceptance attitudes.
• a credulous agent can accept any proposition p if it is backed by an argument.
• a cautious agent can accept any proposition p if it is unable to construct a stronger argument for ¬p.
• a skeptical agent can accept any proposition p if there is an acceptable argument for p.
Since agents are typically involved in both asserting and accepting propositions, we denote the combination of an agent's two attitudes as
The effects of this range of agent attitudes on dialogue outcomes is studied in [20] , and for the rest of this paper we will focus on thoughtful/skeptical agents.
TYPES OF DIALOGUE
Previously [19] we defined three protocols for information seeking, inquiry and persuasion dialogues. These protocols are deliberately simple, the simplest we can imagine that can satisfy the definitions given by [25] , since we believe that we need to understand the behaviour of these simple protocols before we are to able to understand more complex protocols.
Information-seeking.
In an information seeking dialogue, one participant seeks the answer to some question from another participant. If the information seeker is agent A and the other agent is B , then we can define the protocol IS for an information seeking dialogue about a proposition p as follows:
A asks question(p).
B replies with either assert(p), assert(¬p), or assert(U).
Which will depend upon the contents of its knowledgebase and its assertion attitude. U indicates that, for whatever reason B cannot give an answer.
3.
A either accepts B 's response, if its acceptance attitude allows, or challenges. U cannot be challenged and as soon as it is asserted, the dialogue terminates without the question being resolved.
B replies to a challenge with an assert(S )
, where S is the support of an argument for the last proposition challenged by A.
Go to 3 for each proposition in S in turn.
Note that A accepts whenever possible, only being able to challenge when unable to accept-"only" in the sense of only being able to challenge then and challenge being the only locution other than accept that it is allowed to make. More flexible dialogue protocols are allowed, as in [2] , but at the cost of possibly running forever 6 .
Inquiry. In an inquiry dialogue, the participants collaborate to answer some question whose answer is not known to either. There are a number of ways in which one might construct an inquiry dialogue (for example see [13] ). Here we present one simple possibility. We assume that two agents A and B have already agreed to engage in an inquiry about some proposition p by some control dialogue as suggested in [14] , and from this point can adopt the following protocol I:
2. B accepts q → p if its acceptance attitude allows, or challenges it.
3. A replies to a challenge with an assert(S ), where S is the support of an argument for the last proposition challenged by B .
4. Goto 2 for each proposition s ∈ S in turn, replacing q → p by s.
5. B asserts q, or r → q for some r , or U. 6 The protocol in [2] allows an agent to interject with question(p) for any p at several points, making it possible for a dialogue between two agents to continue indefinitely.
If A(CS (A)∪CS (B )
) includes an argument for p which is acceptable to both agents, then first A and then B accept it and the dialogue terminates successfully.
7. Go to 5, reversing the roles of A and B and substituting r for q and some t for r .
This protocol 7 is basically a series of implied IS dialogues. First A asks "do you know of anything which would imply p were it known?". B replies with one, or the dialogue terminates with U. If A accepts the implication, B asks "now, do you know q, or any r which would imply q were it known?", and the process repeats until either the process bottoms out in a proposition which both agents agree on, or there is no new implication to add to the chain.
Persuasion. In a persuasion dialogue, one party seeks to persuade another party to adopt a belief or point-of-view he or she does not currently hold. The dialogue game DC, on which the moves in [2] are based, is fundamentally a persuasion game, so the protocol below results in games which are very like those described in [2] . This protocol, P, is as follows, where agent A is trying to persuade agent B to accept p.
A asserts p.
B accepts p if its acceptance attitude allows, if not B
asserts ¬p if it is allowed to, or otherwise challenges p.
3. If B asserts ¬p, then goto 2 with the roles of the agents reversed and ¬p in place of p.
If B has challenged, then:
(a) A asserts S , the support for p;
(b) Goto 2 for each s ∈ S in turn.
If at any point an agent cannot make the indicated move, it has to concede the dialogue game. If A concedes, it fails to persuade B that p is true. If B concedes, then A has succeeded in persuading it. An agent also concedes the game if at any point if there are no propositions made by the other agent that it hasn't accepted. We should point out that this kind of persuasion dialogue does not assume that agents necessarily start from opposite positions, one believing p and one believing ¬p. Instead one agent believes p and the other may believe ¬p, but also may believe neither p nor ¬p. This is perfectly consistent with the notion of persuasion suggested by Walton and Krabbe [25] .
Note that all three of these protocols have the same core steps. One agent asserts something, the other accepts if it can, otherwise it challenges. A challenge provokes the assertion of the grounds, which are in turn either accepted or challenged. The proposition p that is the first assertion, and the central proposition of the dialogue, is said to be the subject of the dialogue. This basic framework has been shown [17, 19] to be capable of capturing a range of dialogue types. Here we examine what its consequences are in terms of the outcomes of dialogues that are carried out using this framework.
DIALOGUE OUTCOMES
One important set of properties to consider of a dialogue system intended for use between autonomous agents is the extent to which the outcome of the dialogue depends upon the way the dialogue progresses, on the knowledge 8 that agents choose to reveal to one another, rather than on what they believe to be true, and the protocol.
To do this, we need a precise notion of the outcome of a dialogue. There are several things that can be used to measure an outcome. One is in terms of the what agents come to accept during the course of the dialogue: For each acceptance outcome for a given agent, we say that the other agent has accepted the proposition in question. Since propositions that are not the subject of the dialogue are often accepted, an acceptance result need not be the subject of the dialogue.
We can also relate outcomes to what agents know. We define:
Definition 10. Consider two agents F and G that are engaging in a dialogue. Then:
• the set of knowledge outcomes for F O k (F |G) is the set of all the propositions p such that p is the conclusion of an argument in A(ΣF ∪ CS (G)); • the set of joint knowledge outcomes O k (F ∧ G) is the set of all the propositions p such that p is the conclusion of an argument in A(ΣF ∪ ΣG );
• the set of committed outcomes for F Oc(F |G) is the set of all the propositions p such that p is the conclusion of an argument in A(CS (F )); and
• the set of joint committed outcomes Oc(F ∧ G) is the set of all the propositions p such that p is the conclusion of an argument in A(CS (F ) ∪ CS (G)).
We can also define the acceptable subsets of these outcomesthe acceptable knowledge outcomes for F O 
F ∧ G).
Note that all but the joint knowledge outcomes and acceptable joint knowledge outcomes will change over the course of a dialogue as the contents of the commitment stores alter. Unless otherwise noted, here we will only consider these sets at the end of a dialogue. Now, it is easy to show that there is an inclusion relationship between knowledge and committed outcomes:
Proposition 1. For a dialogue between any two agents F and G:
O k (F |G) ⊆ O k (F ∧ G) Oc(F |G) ⊆ Oc(F ∧ G) Oc(F |G) ⊆ O k (F |G) Oc(F ∧ G) ⊆ O k (F ∧ G)
Proof. Since an agent's commitment store is a subset of its knowledge base, (ΣF ∪ CS (G)) ⊆ ΣF ∪ ΣG , and the first relation follows directly from the monotonicity of propositional logic. The remaining relations follow for similar reasons.
No such firm relationship exists between acceptable knowledge and committed outcomes: 
Proof. This follows from the non-monotonicity of acceptability. If there are no conflicting arguments in A(ΣF
) or A(ΣG ), then O a k (F |G), O a k (F ∧G), O a c (F |G), and O a c (F ∧ G) will be exactly O k (F |G), O k (F ∧ G),
Oc(F |G), and Oc(F ∧ G), respectively, and the relationship between the sets of arguments will be as in Proposition 1. However, if between them the agents have a pair of arguments that make each other unacceptable-({a, a → c}, c) and ({b, b → ¬c}, ¬c) (all with the same preference), for example-then if neither has been asserted, O
a k (F |G) ⊆ O a k (F ∧ G). If G
asserts one of these arguments and F does not, then O a c (F |G) ⊆ O a c (F ∧ G). If F then asserts its argument, then its conclusion will be an acceptable committed outcome but cannot be an acceptable knowledge outcome for F , so O a c (F ∧ G) ⊆ O a k (F |G). Finally, either agent might have asserted something, r say, that is acceptable given what it knows and what the other agent has in its commitment store (and so is an acceptable joint committed outcome), but which the other agent has a stronger argument against (and so cannot be an acceptable joint knowledge outcome) since the dialogue may end before the acceptability of r comes into question. Hence the relationships in question depend on the contents of the agents' knowledge bases and the commitment stores.
This result is a positive one. Without it dialogues would be so predictable that we did not even need to consider what the agents knew in order to predict the outcome. What the result means is that-since the content of the commitment stores is critical in determining the outcomes, and since the contents of the commitment stores is determined by what moves the agents make, and the moves are determined in part by the protocol-the protocol has a role in determining the outcome of the dialogues.
Finally, to end the preliminaries, we can relate acceptance outcomes and acceptable knowledge outcomes:
Proposition 3. If p is an acceptance result for F in a dialogue with G, then p is an acceptable knowledge outcome for F and G. The reverse does not hold.
Proof. For p to be an acceptance result for F , is has to be asserted by F and accepted by G. To be asserted by F , it must be acceptable given all F knows and all G has asserted-thus it has to be an acceptable knowledge outcome for F . To accept p, G has to check p against the contents of its knowledge base and what F has in its commitment store. So if p is accepted, it must be an acceptable knowledge outcome for G. For p to be an acceptance result for F , F must assert it and have it accepted by G. Consider a dialogue in which F asserts q, it is challenged by G, and so F asserts the support of q, which includes p. Now suppose that G finds that the first element of the support, r say, is not acceptable given ΣG ∪CS (F ). The dialogue will end without p being accepted, even if p is an acceptable knowledge outcome for G (and it has to be one for F before it can be asserted).
The fact that the result does not hold in both directions is the reason that we need both notions of outcome in order to characterise the results of dialogues. Now we are ready to characterise the outcomes of dialogues. Since the proposition U indicates that a dialogue ends because of a lack of knowledge, we consider dialogues that end with a U or a repeated locution to have failed in some way. Thus any dialogue that does not end in this way will be said to be successful. Information seeking dialogues will end, if successful, with one agent getting the other to accept p or ¬p:
dialogue between agents F and G about p under protocol IS, in which F makes the first move, will end either with one of:
• G making the move U;
• one agent repeating a locution;
• p or ¬p being an acceptance result for G. [19] , this results in either the acceptance of the support and thus whichever of p and ¬p was initially asserted, or a repeated locution, when an unacceptable member of the support is challenged twice. Either way the result holds.
Proof. If F moves first, G asserts p, ¬p, or U. The latter ends the dialogue. Otherwise F accepts, in which case the p or ¬p is an acceptance result for G, or challenges. If F challenges, G asserts the support for p, and F considers each member of the support in turn. As in
As a result of Proposition 3, a successful dialogue between agents F and G about p under protocol IS can result in either p or ¬p being in the set of acceptable knowledge outcomes for both agents.
Persuasion dialogues can end with either agent having an acceptance outcome:
dialogue between agents F and G about p under protocol P, in which F makes the first move, will end with one of:
• p being an acceptance outcome for F ; or
• ¬p being an acceptance outcome for G.
Proof. If F moves first, it asserts p. If G does not challenge, the rest of the dialogue plays out like a dialogue about p under IS that G starts, and ends with a repeated locution or p being an acceptance result for F (U can only be uttered at an earlier point). If G asserts ¬p, either F ends the dialogue by reasserting p, or the rest of the dialogue plays out like a dialogue about ¬p under IS that F starts. Either way, the result holds.
Again, Proposition 3 tells us that a successful persuasion dialogue between agents F and G about p under protocol P ends with either p or ¬p being in the set of acceptable knowledge outcomes of both agents.
Inquiry dialogues are a little different, since successful inquiry dialogues do not, as defined, have acceptance outcomes that directly relate to the subject of the dialogue. However, we can characterise the outcome as follows: 
PREDETERMINISM
As was shown in [20] , if all agents in a dialogue are both thoughtful/skeptical, then one agent cannot deliberately mislead another in the sense of the dialogue having an acceptance outcome for the first agent concerning a proposition if the first agent has a better argument for the negation of that proposition. However, this does not prevent dialogues having acceptance outcomes in situations where intuitively both agents together should be able to figure out that the proposition in question should not be accepted, as the following result shows: Now, there are two ways to read this result. One, which we will call the tactical dialogue reading, takes this result as a positive feature of the IS, I, and P protocols. According to this position, one wishes to build agents that have some kind of rhetorical ability, and can, by clever tactics, get other agents to accept things that they might otherwise not accept. In other words, we want protocols which do not make the outcome predetermined by the agents' knowledge.
The positive view of the IS, I, and P protocols in the tactical dialogue view is further bolstered by the following result: A different view of the protocols, what we will call the dialogue as mechanism view, suggests that Propositions 7 and 8 are both negative. From this perspective, dialogue protocols should be like economic mechanisms [12] . In the same way that economic mechanism design tries to ensure that the results of, for instance, an auction does not depend upon the order in which the bids are made but only the values participants place upon the good being auctioned, so the outcomes of dialogues should not depend upon the order of agents' locutions, but upon what they know. In other words, the outcomes should be predetermined.
Both these last results are special cases of: This result in turn suggests that equivalence of acceptance outcomes and the acceptable joint knowledge outcomes might be an important consideration in determining whether protocols allow for tactical play or whether they predetermine the outcome. Certainly, the set of acceptable joint knowledge outcomes (as remarked above) is the only one of the outcome measures we are dealing with that can be identified without going through a dialogue. In fact: This, then, gives us a way to test whether a protocol ensures a predetermined outcome-all we have to do is to see whether it allows propositions that are not in the set of acceptable joint knowledge outcomes. Now, the key thing about the result given above is that the set of acceptable joint knowledge outcomes is in some sense the maximal set of propositions that can be obtained from the dialogue. It is not necessarily the biggest set of acceptable outcomes, the nonmonotonicity of argumentation sees to that, but it is based on all the arguments that might be put forward by both participants. Thus once a proposition makes it into the set of acceptable joint knowledge outcomes, there are no more arguments that might overturn it. This gives us a way that is easy to state, for adapting the protocols IS, I, and P to make them predetermined. We just ensure that every proposition that will be needed to establish the acceptable joint knowledge outcomes is asserted. Of course, while this is easy to state, it is much harder to establish exactly what the right propositions should be.
One solution would be to simply assert the full set of propositions in ΣF and ΣG , ensuring that the full set of necessary propositions has to be asserted. However, this kind of approach will be inefficient in general, both in the communication it requires, and the time and computational resources the agents consume in processing this information. A better solution is to only assert those propositions that will have a bearing on the acceptability of the subject of the dialogue. Since the propositions that need to be asserted must be part of arguments that attack the argument supporting the subject (or attack arguments that attack such arguments, and so on), then it is possible to identify them. However, it is hard to see how to identify them systematically, since their connection could be revealed at any time.
For now the only way we can see to ensure that all necessary propositions are asserted is to modify dialogues along the lines of one of the inquiry dialogue in [20] . Under this protocol, (i) any response to a challenge involves the assertion of the support for every argument for the proposition in question, (ii) at every step in the proof, every possible implication that might form the next step of the proof is asserted, and (iii) agents are released from the need to take turns. Future work will consider if there is a notion of relevance that can help to better identify the minimal set of propositions to assert.
Finally, it seems to us that the choice of whether dialogues should have predetermined outcomes or allow for tactical play is one that will depend upon the context in which the dialogues are taking place. The results presented here should make it possible to choose the right kind of dialogue for a given context, but further work is required to establish which contexts require which kind of dialogue.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has extended the analysis of formal inter-agent dialogues in [19] . We have provided the first detailed characterisation of the outcomes of such dialogues, and then we have investigated the extent to which outcomes are dependent on tactical play by the agents. Finding that tactics can have a big effect on the outcome, we then identified how to rule out the effect of tactics, arguing that this is desirable from a mechanism design perspective.
More work, of course, remains to be done in this area in addition to that outlined above. Particularly important are: determining the relationship between the locutions we use in these dialogues and those of agent communication languages such as the FIPA ACL; examining the effect of adding new locutions (such as retract) to the language; extending the system with a more detailed model of preferences; and providing an implementation. We are currently investigating these matters along with further dialogue types, such as planning dialogues [9] .
